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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES’ TERRITORIES AS COMPARED TO THE STATES AND 
FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
Mary A. Shahverdian* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the adolescence of the nation, the Constitution of the United States of 
America was created as a framework for our government, granting powers—
and restrictions on those powers—to the branches of government, while also 
guaranteeing some universal rights to the constituents of the United States 
that may not be infringed upon by the government. Across a series of cases, 
the question of the extraterritorial force of the Constitution was, and 
continues to be, encountered. These are the Insular Cases, a series of 
Supreme Court opinions in the 1900s about the status of territories the United 
States had recently acquired in the Spanish-American War.1 As the United 
States continued to grow, the issue relating to the governance of 
unincorporated United States Territories was one of the most highly-litigated 
problems of American constitutional law.2 
Although these cases were decided more than a century ago, they are 
still an important ongoing issue to Judge José Cabranes, Circuit Court Judge 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.3 Cabrenes 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Mary A. Shahverdian is a J.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
1 See generally Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); 
Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Grossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley 
v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. 
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States (The Diamond Rings), 183 U.S. 
176 (1901). 
2 Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 
59 (2013). 
3 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judges/bios/jac.html (last visited Mar. 11, 
2019). 
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posits that an significant element of the Insular Cases has been 
circumventing “irreparable injustice” in the extraterritorial function of 
constitutional rights.4 One constitutional right at issue in the Insular Cases is 
the power for individual states and territories to govern within their borders 
without the arm of the federal government overextending itself through the 
implied powers of the Commerce Clause. 
In this paper, I argue that the Dormant Commerce Clause has an unfair 
impact on criminal law in the United States Territories, which do not obtain 
the same level of benefits under the federal government as the states under 
the precedent of the Insular Cases, and therefore violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As a solution, I argue that either the 
application of the Commerce Clause should be reduced to accommodate the 
unique needs of the territories, or the United States Territories should be fully 
absorbed as states to protect some semblance of federalism in a time when 
the enumerated powers of the Commerce Clause are only expanding. I 
recommend allowing the members of the legislative branch, who represent 
the U.S. Territories, to become voting members, just as other states, so they 
have a voice in the federal laws that control them. 
I. THE INSULAR CASES 
The United States obtained sovereignty over what they termed “insular” 
territories as a result of the Spanish-American War of 1898.5 These insular 
areas remain under U.S. sovereignty today.6 The five nonstate territories 
discussed in this argument are Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands 
(USVI), American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands (CNMI).7 These territories are areas which do not share a physical 
border with mainland United States so lawmakers at the time could not 
envision a future wherein those detached areas would become fully absorbed 
                                                                                                                           
 
4 José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application 
of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1704–06 (2009) (discussing case law demonstrating 
“[c]constraints set forth by the Constitution on the power of the government are more likely to be enforced 
when the risk of irreparable injustice is high”). 
5 See generally Torruella, supra note 2. 
6 See generally STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, JR., THE LAW OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND 
AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS §§ 3:3–3:6 (1995). 
7 Id. 
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as incorporated states.8 The constitutionality of federal law as applied to these 
U.S. Territories was determined in the Insular Cases, a series of Supreme 
Court decisions in the early twentieth century. These cases set a precedent 
for American paternalism over its extended territories strongly influenced by 
racial undercurrents of American policy that still linger today.9 
In Downes v. Bidwell, a key Insular Case, Justice White of the Supreme 
Court held the majority view that the procedural protections for criminal 
defendants specified in the Bill of Rights do not uniformly apply to 
defendants in those territories that had not yet been “incorporated” into the 
United States.10 Downes is a crucial case in territorial history because it 
determined that the Constitution as a whole would not apply to Puerto Rico”11 
By imposing duties on goods imported from Puerto Rico to the continental 
United States, the Court decided that certain constitutional provisions within 
the revenue clauses could not confine the federal government’s actions in 
controlling these areas automatically.12 Specifically, the Court held that 
Puerto Rico did not fall under the Tax Uniformity Clause, which requires that 
“all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.”13 
It is from the Downes case that the position of Puerto Rico and other 
territories in the federal landscape is decided.14 I argue that to apply 
constitutional protections only partially, yet expand federal policing powers 
through the Commerce Clause, represents a constitutional offense to the 
people of the U.S. Territories. 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 657, 681 (2013) (citing Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and 
Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005). 
9 RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL 
ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893–1946, at 15 (1972). 
10 Price, supra note 8, at 683 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (“We are therefore of 
opinion that the Island of Porto [sic] Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, 
but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution . . . .)). 
11 Torruella, supra note 2, at 69. 
12 Downes, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (White J., concurring). 
13 U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
14 Torruella, supra note 2, at 70. 
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II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states.”15 By its explicit text, the Commerce 
Clause provides Congress the right to regulate interstate commerce.16 But, it 
also impliedly grants a “dormant” power. There is no actual “Dormant 
Commerce Clause” found in the Constitution. Rather, the Supreme Court 
created the right to create restrictions on state action through inferences made 
in analysis of the Commerce Clause.17 The Dormant Commerce Clause is a 
constitutional law doctrine that extends congressional authority beyond the 
explicit power to “regulate commerce among the several states,” meaning 
federal commerce between states18 into an implicit right to restrict state 
power over the same area.19 It restricts state power in favor of isolating this 
power to the federal government.20 
There is no textual support for the doctrine of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause in the Constitution.21 Instead, the doctrine has been explained by the 
federal courts as to forbid states from unduly interfering with interstate 
commerce.22 The pivotal case of Gibbons v. Ogden initiated an expansion of 
the Commerce Clause’s interpretation though the implied dormant powers 
that are within the lines of the original text. In this case, a New York state 
law was at issue because it tolerated a monopoly over navigational waters in 
the state, preventing a steamboat operator from navigating from New York 
to New Jersey.23 Justice Marshall concluded that the interstate navigation 
could not be interfered with by the laws of one state because that power is 
reserved for Congress under the Commerce Clause.24 Justice Marshall wrote 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
16 Id. 
17 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
18 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
19 Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1998). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1203 (citing Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 43, 51 (1988) (“The dormant commerce power doctrine has no direct support in the text of the 
Constitution.”). 
22 McGreal, supra note 19, at 1192. 
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that the authority to regulate interstate commerce “can never be exercised by 
the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie 
dormant.”25 This case created the language used still today to describe the 
implied congressional power over interstate commerce, and ultimately, the 
Gibbons case established that congressional power under the Commerce 
Clause is very expansive, and incorporates all commercial interaction 
between and among states.26 This holding from 1824 still carries weight in 
modern judicial decisions. As recently as 2008, the federal courts relied on 
Gibbons to permit congressional authority over matters of interstate 
commerce.27 
The Dormant Commerce Clause can be violated by state statute in 
several ways. The first kind of violation occurs when the state statute 
obviously favors in-state commerce over interstate commerce.28 When this 
happens, the statute is clearly in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
powers of Congress.29 This means the statute “discriminates against interstate 
commerce” without “advanc[ing] a legitimate local purpose that cannot be 
adequately served by reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives.”30 Second, 
if the statute is invalid under the Pike balancing test derived from Pike v. 
Bruce Church,31 then the Dormant Commerce Clause is implicated.32 The 
Pike balancing test makes a statute invalid if the supposed local benefits are 
significantly outweighed by the state statute’s burden on interstate 
commerce.33 If the state statute regulates intrastate commerce fairly and 
impartially to bring about a legitimate interest of the local public, and its 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824). 
26 See generally Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189. 
27 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 574 F.3d 929, 941 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Where 
Congress fails to legislate on a matter concerning interstate commerce, a dormant implication of the 
Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate 
commerce and thereby impedes free private trade in the national marketplace.”). 
28 Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267 (8th Cir. 2006); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (deciding that New Jersey’s law “block[ing] the importation of waste” from outside 
the state was impermissible under the Commerce Clause.). 
29 Id. 
30 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Envt’l Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)). 
31 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
32 Id. 
33 Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338–39 (2008) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). 
 
452 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:447 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.191 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
consequence on interstate commerce is fairly minor, then the state legislation 
is valid under Pike.34 Under these circumstances, the statute will be upheld 
as valid under the Commerce Clause unless its impact on interstate commerce 
is “clearly excessive in relation to putative local benefits.”35 The third way 
the Dormant Commerce Clause can be implicated by a state statute is when 
an application of the statute has a practical impact on extraterritorial control 
of interstate commerce.36 This type of implication is demonstrated in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, above, because the New York statute blocked avenues to 
New Jersey.37 These three limitations on state authority granted by the 
dormant commerce clause may be relaxed by congressional action which 
“authorizes state regulations . . . that burden or discriminate against interstate 
commerce.”38 
A. Criminal Law 
The federal government’s covert power is only derived from case law 
regarding trade, yet it is formidable enough to attempt to extend into criminal 
law.39 In United States v. Lopez, arguments made to the Supreme Court 
revealed an application of the congressional Commerce Clause power in 
terms of enacting criminal law under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine.40 However, that argument failed. The Court ultimately decided that 
the power of Congress to regulate state activities extends only to specific 
actions that affect interstate commerce quite considerably.41 This stance was 
reaffirmed in United States v. Morrison, wherein the court opined that “[t]he 
Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local.”42 Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under the 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
35 Id.; see also R&M Oil, 307 F.3d at 735. 
36 See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). 
37 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
38 Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003). 
39 See, e.g., USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir. 1995); Pic-a-
State PA, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 42 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding state criminal law that 
“complements a federal statute” does not violate the dormant commerce clause). 
40 Brandon L. Bigelow, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 B.S. L. REV. 913, 913 (2000) 
(citing United States v. Lopez, at 556–57, 561). 
41 Id. 
42 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
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Commerce Clause since the state criminal statute at issue did not control an 
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.43 
III. THE STRUGGLE TO APPLY UNIFORM LAW IN THE TERRITORIES 
Territories have no inherent authority under the Constitution.44 In the 
territories, all governmental power is federal in character and stems from a 
delegation from Congress either directly or indirectly.45 Congress has 
“plenary” authority over the territories, even though territorial governments 
have some statutory authority to exercise considerable sovereignty over their 
own jurisdiction.46 Plenary authority means that Congress can “revise, alter, 
or revoke” any established system of government that controls the 
territories,47 even if it seems doubtful that Congress will actually make 
changes to those arrangements in a style essentially oppositional to the local 
wishes of people in those territories.48 Commerce of the District of Columbia 
and of the United States Territories do not constitute interstate commerce 
under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.49 Plenary 
congressional authority over the territories textually results from the 
Territory Clause of the Constitution, which proclaims that Congress has the 
“Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting 
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”50 The 
Supreme Court has not understood the Territory Clause to offer plenary 
authority over any incorporated State or over the District of Columbia, but 
rather only all other areas subject to U.S. sovereignty.51 This essentially 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 Id. 
44 Price, supra note 8, at 679. 
45 Id. at 680. (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 (noting Congress’ constitutional power over 
territories); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 321 (1978) (“[A] territorial government is entirely 
the creation of Congress . . . .”). 
46 Price, supra note 8, at 679. 
47 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 296 (1958). 
48 Price, supra note 8, at 680. 
49 15 AM. JUR. 2D COMMERCE § 3, citing Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 
434–35 (1932); see also Milton S. Kronheim & Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (courts should apply the same analysis over interstate analysis to the District of Columbia as to state 
laws). 
50 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
51 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 430 (1973) (recognizing plenary 
congressional power over the territories). 
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means that plenary authority is reserved for only unincorporated territories 
such as Puerto Rico, the USVI and Guam. 
The plenary authority over the territories has significant constitutional 
impacts on the citizens of these areas. A key impact exists to criminal 
defendants in the territories, who lose procedural protections because 
territorial governments do not have to provide them with equivalent 
procedural guarantees applicable in federal prosecutions.52 
The Insular Cases held that certain constitutional protections were 
inappropriate in the U.S. Territories.53 However, the Supreme Court allowed 
them to maintain merely the basic constitutional protections of personal 
rights. For example, the fundamental right that no person could be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” was to remain a right 
of the citizens of the U.S. Territories.54 Though early federal policy covering 
the nonstate territories was initially invasive to the local governance, by the 
1950’s Congress adopted the “organic” statutes, which were created to 
encourage adoption of local governance and legislatures.55 The outcome of 
the organic statutes included the locally drafted constitution for Puerto 
Rico,56 and the authorization of the drafting of similar constitutions for Guam 
and the USVI.57 However, neither territory has implemented an analogous 
constitution.58 
As a result of the organic statutes, all five of the major insular U.S. 
Territories enforce locally legislated criminal prohibitions and procedures in 
a method very similar to that of a state government.59 In recent years, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has begun to re-examine the 
                                                                                                                           
 
52 Price, supra note 8, at 679. 
53 See, e.g., Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13 (1922) (discussing inapplicability of grand jury indictment 
requirements in Puerto Rico); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 at 148–49 (concluding “power to govern 
territory . . . given to Congress in the Constitution . . . does not require that body to enact for ceded 
territory not made a part of the United States . . . a system of laws which shall include the right of trial by 
jury”). 
54 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312–13. 
55 See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 121–38 (2004) (describing the transition from elected to 
appointed governors in territories). 
56 48 U.S.C. § 731d (2006). 
57 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1424-4 (2006). 
58 GUAMPEDIA, Guam Constitutional Conventions (ConCon), https://www.guampedia.com/guam-
constitutional-conventions-concon/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
59 Price, supra note 8, at 681–82. 
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constitutional exceptionalism originally permitted to the territories in the 
Insular Cases. The flexible application of the United States Constitution and 
Bill of Rights to citizens of the unincorporated territories may no longer be 
applicable to the most noteworthy territories of the United States.60 
Eventually, Congress implemented most, but not all, Bill of Rights 
obligations on local territorial governments.61 
However, this quasi-applicability of constitutional protections over 
criminal defendants remains today as a major conflict in the court systems of 
the U.S. Territories. The U.S. Territories are treated neither exactly as states 
nor as foreign nations. For example, there is no local statutory right to a trial 
by jury for defendants in American Samoa, due to a conflict of powers in the 
lawmaking authority over the island.62 Congress has never ratified an organic 
statute inaugurating a local Samoan government. Instead, Congress merely 
decided that the Constitution of American Samoa could not be changed 
without the approval of Congress.63 American Samoa also faces the problem 
of not falling into the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court.64 To rectify 
these problems, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had to 
interpret the Insular Cases to resolve that the American Constitution compels 
the right to jury trials for criminal cases in local American Samoan courts, 
despite their own local constitution not providing that protection.65 Although 
this change did resolve issues within the American Samoa criminal 
procedure, this decision did not occur until 1975.66 The gap in resolution 
demonstrates that constitutional protection over citizens of American Samoa 
and other territories has long been overlooked. 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 Price, supra note 8, at 680 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 555 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (noticing 
connections of unincorporated territory to the United States may “strengthen in ways that are of 
constitutional significance.) cf. Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 
U.S. 572, 599–600 (1976) (observing “[t]he Court’s decisions respecting the rights of the inhabitants of 
PR have been nether unambiguous nor exactly uniform” but deeming equal protection requirements 
applicable to governmental action in Puerto Rico). 
61 See Territory of Guam v. Inglett, 417 F.2d 123, 124–25 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[W]e are inclined to 
agree . . . that Congress did not intend by enacting section 10(u) of the Guam elective Governor Act to 
repeal 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b) and thus deprive the Guam legislature of the power to determine whether 
offenses should be prosecuted by indictment or information.”). 
62 Price, supra note 8, at 684. 
63 48 U.S.C. § 1662a. 
64 Price, supra note 86, at 706. 
65 Id. at 684–85; see also King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147–48 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
66 Id. 
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A second example exists in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands (CNMI). Just as in American Samoa, criminal defendants to not have 
the right to a jury trial in CNMI.67 The CNMI covenant, which is the 
establishing document by which the United States imposed its authority over 
the territory, posits that “neither trial by jury nor indictment by grand jury 
shall be required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local 
law, except where required by local law.”68 CNMI’s covenant conflicts with 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States. Contrasting the 
situation in American Samoa, where the practice of criminal jury trials is 
maintained due to 1975 federal case law despite the absence of such a local 
constitutional provision, the CNMI legislature does not require grand jury 
indictments for local offenses.69 At the most, criminal procedure only 
provides jury trials for felonies punishable by more than five years of 
incarceration or a minimum $2,000 fine.70 In a 2004 local CNMI case, a court 
declared that “only the CNMI Legislature has the authority to make the right 
to a jury trial the same as in the continental United States.”71 This is a 
distinction from the rule in American Samoa, where a holding from the D.C. 
Circuit court was held applicable to the territory. Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
applied the Insular Cases to uphold the fractional application of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment Rights in CNMI.72 
A third example of the selective application of the American 
Constitution to the United States Territories exists in the United States Virgin 
Island (USVI). In the USVI, indictment by grand jury is entirely voluntary 
for cases involving violations of federal law and charged in the federal court 
in the territory.73 For transgressions of local law, a grand jury indictment is 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (Article V: Applicability of Laws). 
68 Id. 
69 Price, supra note 8, at 685; see CNMI R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (“All offenses except misdemeanors shall 
be prosecuted by information.”). 
70 Price, supra note 8, at 685; see also 7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3101(a) (2011); CNMI R. CRIM. P. 
23(b); see also 6 N. MAR. I. CODE § 2150(a)(8) (2011) (providing right to jury trial “in all cases in which 
the value of property subject to forfeiture under this subsection exceeds $2,000); Commonwealth v. 
Dermapan, No. 4-0006-GA, 2008 WL 3982060, at *3 (N. MAR. I. CODE Aug. 15, 2008) (displaying proper 
application of a jury trial for assault with deadly weapon conviction but not for lesser convictions). 
71 Price, supra note 8, at 685 (citing Commonwealth v. Blas, No. 04-028-GA, 2004 WL 3704018 
at *1 n.4 (N. MAR. I. CODE Dec. 10, 2004) (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1801)). 
72 Price, supra note 8, at 685 (citing Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th 
Cir. 1984)). 
73 48 U.S.C. §§ 1561, 1612 (2006). 
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only required where local legislation demands it, but because no such 
legislation exists, trial by grand jury is practically nonexistence in the 
USVI.74 The Third Circuit buttressed these local provisions in 1980 through 
reasoning that the Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment is 
“not applicable” in this “unincorporated” territory, where “prosecutions have 
always been established by information rather than by grand jury 
indictment.”75 However, it should be noted that the Third Court decision was 
not relied on in the 2013 case of Phillip v. People, a case in the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands which decided that the part of the Third Circuit 
opinion relevant to grand jury indictments was not a holding of the case, but 
rather mere dicta.76 This disparaging opinion in the local judicial system 
demonstrates the discrepancy between federal and local authority in the 
USVI. 
As a whole, the Insular Cases have set a standard for chaos and disarray 
in the U.S. Territories under the Constitution. A combination of federal 
paternalism over the territories in an odd mix with discarding the same areas 
has created a criminal procedure that is unclear and hard to follow. 
A. States 
Officially, all dominion over the unincorporated territories is assigned 
to Congress under the Territory Clause.77 Because of this, the Supreme Court 
has treated scenarios in which “double jeopardy” may come into question 
differently in territories than in states. The concept of double jeopardy 
generally protects a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense.78 
This is not all encompassing; however, because it only protects a defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3581 (1997) (“Every felony and every criminal action in the district 
court shall be prosecuted by information.”); United States v. Plaskett, Crim. No. 2007-60, 2008 WL 
444552, at *2 (D.V.I. Feb. 4, 2008) (finding “neither federal nor territorial crimes must be charged by 
indictment in the Virgin Islands” because “[n]o such local law . . . has been enacted” (citations omitted)). 
75 Price, supra note 8, at 686; Gov’t of V.I. v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660, 667 (3d Cir. 1980); see also 
United States v. Ntreh, 279 F.3d 255, 256–58 (3d Cir. 2002) (noticing that USVI residents have no 
constitutional or statutory right to indictment by grand jury). 
76 Phillip v. People, S. CT. CRIM. No. 2012-0086, 2013 WL 3293904, at *9 n.24 (V.I. June 26, 
2013). 
77 Price, supra note 8, at 714. 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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from being tried twice in the same court.79 Double jeopardy generally does 
not protect a defendant from facing trial in both federal and state courts if 
their crime violates both jurisdictions’ laws.80 However, unlike for states, in 
the U.S. Territories the Court has asserted that that double jeopardy blocks 
prosecutors from bringing two different cases for the same criminal act that 
violates both federal and territorial law.81 In Grafton v. United States, the 
Court expounded its rationale for the unique treatment of the territories 
compared to individual states.82 
[T]he government of the Philippines owes its existence wholly to the United 
States . . . so that the cases holding that the same acts committed in a State . . . 
may constitute an offense against the United States and also a distinct offense 
against the State, do not apply here . . . .83 
Furthermore, the Shell Co. Court reasoned that federal and Territorial 
laws are “creations emanating from the same sovereignty.”84 By this, the 
Court opined that there is no distinction between the government of the 
territory and the government of the United States of America—they are one 
and the same. 
These opinions are problematic as applied to the territories collectively 
because they are all on separate and various levels of independence from 
Congressional authority. Puerto Rico, for example, has a democratically 
elected local governance and constitution.85 Historically, the First Circuit 
originally determined that, despite Puerto Rico’s position as an 
unincorporated territory, it shall nonetheless be treated as a “separate 
sovereign” for double jeopardy purposes.86 This is because Puerto Rico has 
its own established criminal laws, which “like those of a state, emanate from 
a different source than the federal laws.”87 Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 Zak Goldstein, Can I be Tried for the Same Crim in State and Federal Court?, GOLDSTEIN 
MEHTA LLC, https://goldsteinmehta.com/blog/can-i-be-tried-for-the-same-conduct-in-state-and-federal-
court (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
80 Id. 
81 Price, supra note 8, at 682. 
82 Id. 
83 Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354–55 (1907). 
84 People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264 (1937). 
85 Price, supra note 8, at 682. 
86 United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1168 (1st Cir. 1987). 
87 Id.; see also United States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 42 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1987) (Following 
Lopez Andino). 
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rejected the First Circuit’s Lopez Andino opinion, and instead held that Puerto 
Rico is still constitutionally its own separate sovereignty, and is merely a 
territory that belongs to the United States.88 Ultimately, the First Circuit 
formally reversed its original holding and now agrees with the Eleventh 
Circuit.89 However, the Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue. The 
lack of clarity and uniformity in the criminal proceedings of Puerto Rico is a 
product of the Insular Cases, which were decided nearly a century ago based 
on reasoning that is unfounded today. 
B. Foreign Nations 
The Federal Courts have supported the application of the Commerce 
Clause to American Citizens abroad.90 In January 2006, the Ninth Circuit 
held in United States v. Clark that the power granted to Congress under the 
Foreign Commerce Clause supports criminal jurisdiction over United States 
citizens in Cambodia.91 In this case, the defendant was arrested for engaging 
in sexual acts with two minors while abroad.92 The court upheld the 
conviction of that defendant, a U.S. citizen, who was arrested violating the 
PROTECT Act, an American statute condoning “illicit sexual conduct” in 
foreign places, under penalty of a fine or imprisonment.93 This criminal 
statute was not held to be in excess of congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause.94 This is because the Commerce Clause grants the right 
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, despite the legal presumption that 
Congress customarily creates federal criminal statutes with the intent that 
they only be applied domestically.95 To determine whether an American 
criminal statute applies outside of domestic land, it is presumed that there is 
no congressional intent to violate the principles of international law that 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1151–52 (11th Cir. 1993). 
89 See generally United States v. Santiago-Colón, 917 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2019). 
90 John R. Schmertz et al., As Matter of First Impression, Ninth Circuit Determines that Congress’ 
Exercise of Power Under the Foreign Commerce Clause Supports Criminal Jurisdiction Over U.S. 
Citizen’s Commercian Pedophelia in Cambodia, 12 INT’L L. UPDATE 7 (2006). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2018). 
94 Schmertz et al., supra note 90. 
95 Id. 
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permit extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.96 The Ninth Circuit held in Clark 
that, regardless of where the crime is committed, the United States may 
exercise jurisdiction over Americans who are temporarily living in a different 
country, because merely the existence of their citizenship is enough of a 
nexus to conform to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.97 This 
is similar to the treatment of criminal defendants in U.S. Territories because 
they are subject to federal law; however, they are no subject to local or state 
laws. 
IV. PROPOSED RESOLUTION 
The U.S. Territories should be treated as States under the Constitution 
in all aspects of sovereignty. States are insulated by the Tenth Amendment, 
which reserves all power not granted to the federal government to the “States 
respectively, or to the people.”98 Each of the 50 States holds plenary 
governmental authority within their own borders.99 However, the federal 
Constitution can restrict their power, or pre-empt it by use of valid federal 
legislation which is enacted pursuant to legitimate congressional authority—
including the Dormant Commerce Clause.100 
Although most states became absorbed into the United States the same 
manner as the territories, states have more rights and representation than 
territories in the formation of government policy. Unlike territories, who only 
have non-voting delegates,101 States are represented directly in the federal 
legislature.102 I suggest that this discrepancy between the States and the 
Territories be rectified. The U.S. Territories should be, if not fully 
incorporated, upgraded to voting delegates in the House of Representatives 
and should have representation in the Senate. 
                                                                                                                           
 
96 See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1994). 
97 Schmertz, supra note 90. 
98 U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to states and the people powers not conferred on federal 
government). 
99 Price, supra note 8, at 691. 
100 Id. 
101 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, DELEGATES TO THE U.S. CONGRESS: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS 
1 ( Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40555.pdf. 
102 Price, supra note 8, at 691. 
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In conclusion, the mistreatment of the sixteen territories of the United 
States that have still not been formally and completely incorporated is unfair, 
unfounded, and requires modernization. It is time to move past the close-
minded mentality of the legislators at the time of the 1898 Spanish-American 
War. Those leaders could not foresee a time when the distant island territories 
could be absorbed into the United States because they were not 
geographically connected to the mainland.103 Today, this reasoning cannot be 
followed, as travel and communication only gets easier with new 
technologies. It is also impossible to justify this mentality when neither of 
the last two states to join the Union—Hawaii and Alaska—share a border 
with a continental state. The United States, whose governmental framework 
rests on representational democracy, cannot continue to rest on the laurels of 
the Insular Cases—treating the citizens of the territories as second-class to 
states. In no state are the protections guaranteed by the Constitution deemed 
inapplicable, and the same treatment should be shown to the territories. 
Although Congress attempted to rectify these issues with the organic 
statutes,104 this remedy is too much without structure and faces pitfalls in its 
application, as demonstrated by the problems in American Samoa, CNMI, 
and USVI. Thus, the Constitution as applied to the insular territories needs 
to be revisited. 
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